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Notions of national security, most notoriously, have invoked realities and necessities that
everyone is supposed to acknowledge, but also vague generalities about everything and
nothing. Much of the rhetorical force and political legitimation expressed through modern
discourses of security rests ultimately on this simultaneous appeal to the hard and the
vacuous, the precise and the imprecise, the exaction of blood and sacrifice in the name of
the grand generalization…This time, vague generalities are increasingly articulated under
the sign of the global rather than of the reason of state.1
April of this year saw the introduction of Canada’s first national security policy in a document titled Securing
an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy. The policy document outlines a broad and integrated
approach to national security to respond to what Prime Minister Paul Martin describes as an “increasingly
complex and dangerous threat environment.”  The policy is intended to work as a strategic framework for2
action to address “three core national security interests” – “protecting Canada and Canadians at home and
abroad;” “Ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to Canada’s allies;” and “Contributing to international
security.”  The integrated approach to national security is framed around the creation of new agencies3
devoted to securing the Canadian population and territorial state through development in six strategic areas
of national security: ‘Intelligence,’ ‘Emergency Planning and Management,’ ‘Public Health,’ ‘Transport
Security,’ ‘Border Security,’ and ‘International Security.’ New agencies include an Integrated Threat
Assessment Centre for the purpose of centralizing “threat-related material,” a National Security Advisory
Council composed of ‘security experts,’ a new public health agency along with new regional public health
centres, an RCMP review mechanism and a Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to act as an ethno-cultural
and religious advisory body.  Much of the responsibility for the integration and proper functioning of security4
activities among federal departments and security agencies falls to the Department of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness created in December of 2003, just prior to the release of the national security
policy. The document explains security measures already in place and outlines future plans to address
remaining “security gaps.”  In both budgetary and political terms however, the new policy is not solely5
shaped by the planned implementation of new security mechanisms, but includes a series of measures
brought into force since the events of September 11  2001. More recent events, such as the Ontario blackoutth
and the SARS outbreak in the summer of 2003, also led to immediate security initiatives and serve as
additional factors that directly shape the policy. The structure of the document reflects this, wherein each
chapter notes ‘what has been done’ and ‘what is planned’ in the formation of a national security policy for
Canada. Thus, the $690 million  committed for the implementation of this new national security agenda is6
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a significantly lower reflection of the actual money that has been put towards Canada’s post 9/11 security
strategy. 
There are two notable characteristics of the Policy that illuminate important aspects of modern power
relations. The first is the articulation of the freedom, health, and safety of the Canadian population as a
primary security objective. While continuing to share an understanding of the state (and therefore also
political authority) as the solution to the problem of (in)security, the treatment of the population as a core
national security concern represents a departure from traditional interpretations of security, which have
tended to posit states as the primary, and often only, objects.   No doubt this fits squarely with Canada’s7
‘human security’ agenda, which has sought to broaden security to more intimately address the multitude of
issues that affect people’s well being. The second characteristic concerns the emphasis on surveillance.
While the policy explicitly devotes only one strategic area to intelligence, further investigation shows that
securing each strategic area relies in large part on the development of routine surveillance practices and
infrastructure. Enhancing surveillance, as a national security strategy, is a salient response to the criticisms
of prominent figures of intelligence studies such as Wesley Wark, who argues that the remedy for Canada’s
“immature security system” is to posit “intelligence as the first line of defense.”  Indeed, this is precisely8
what the policy sets out to do. The culmination of these characteristics informs a new national security
approach that rationalizes Canada as both a sovereign state oriented to ends-means strategies and as a
collective population that requires subjection to regulatory mechanisms to secure it from a range of broadly
conceived ‘risks’ that fit under the equally ambiguous rubric of liberty, health, and safety.  
This paper examines Canada’s first national security policy in relation to Foucault’s postulation that
modern society is marked by the emergence of biopower, a new mechanism of power that is principally
concerned with the management of biological life. Alongside disciplinary power, which focuses on individual
members of a society, arose ‘biopolitics,’ which conceives of and focuses on the life of populations. This
power focused on life has meant that the problem of how best to govern has not only been posed as effecting
ultimate dominion over a sovereign territory, but increasingly as one of yielding productive services from
the citizenry. According to Foucault, ‘reason of state’ is no longer confined to the will of the prince, but is
“government in accordance with the state’s strength,” that includes the ‘ends-means’ instrumental rationality
associated with state survival in a competitive international system conjoined with the observance of what
is governed, and how government might improve or enhance the qualities of a population.  This study is9
invested in examining how state-building projects of national security, such as Canada’s national security
policy, are mobilized through discourses and administrative practices that take elusive risks to the freedom,
health, and safety of the population as an opportunity for action, and are made possible through a generalized
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expansion of surveillance. This reading of the new security policy suggests that the biopolitical character of
security has greatly reduced the traditionally accepted distinctions between the state as a military and
legitimated actor and the state as a service providing, regulatory agency for the management of the citizenry.
In the context of national security, biopolitics, I suggest, has left unscathed a rationalization of the state as
a direct authority, while also fostering decentralized mechanisms of rule that govern ‘at a distance.’ 
The relationship between biopolitics and security is key to apprehending this development. The
management of life through surveillance mechanisms situates biological life, largely to the exclusion of
political life, as the foundational object of security. The policy’s continual references to the importance of
securing the freedom, health, and safety of the national population illustrate a clear objective to secure the
‘life’ of the Canadian population. Yet, on the same note, the erosion of civil liberties and the heightened
policing of people in order to detect ‘risk’ areas and groups, that have accompanied recent and proposed
security mechanisms, are paradoxically presented as the most tangible prospect for ensuring safety and
guarding this same freedom. As a biopolitical force that takes the life of the population as its object, in an
important sense the spreading of security has come to represent not only a distinctive, but also exclusionary
rendering of freedom and safety. To address these securitizing practices,  the paper addresses the policy as10
a security strategy that is reliant on surveillance mechanisms for the detection of unsecured, and therefore
‘dangerous,’ lives. 
To pursue this inquiry, the paper first discusses the emergence of biopolitics and its connection to
mechanisms of security. The paper is subsequently divided into three sections. The first examines how the
policy deploys truth claims over ‘threat’ as an immanent characteristic of modern life, and how the content
of Canadian values that are said to both subscribe to a belief in the immanence of threats and rationally
accept the national security policy as a response, work to produce an internal ‘Other’ that represents the
proliferation of threats. The discussion then focuses on two techniques through which national security is
deployed: first, the liberty, health, and safety of the population, which is analyzed predominately with
reference to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and second, surveillance, by
considering the expansion and development of intelligence practices that gives national security a totalizing
reach. The paper concludes by returning to Foucault’s theorization of biopolitics and its relationship to war
and racism to suggest some possible implications of the new policy in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’
and for societies that are increasingly organized around ‘risk.’
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Biopolitics
According to Foucault since the seventeenth century western societies have been marked by biopower. In
contrast to the classical theory of sovereignty which saw the state’s involvement in human affairs limited to
non-intervention in life or putting to death, biopower saw the “acquisition of power over man insofar as man
is a living being,” signifying the emergence of state control over biological life.  Death or the allowance of11
life are essentially inconsequential to the relationship between sovereign and subject because, beyond the
initial duality of life and death that underscores the Hobbesian ‘contract,’ nothing is guaranteed or owed.
However, insofar as it is through killing that sovereign power is actively exercised over life, death is
favoured.  Hence, the power to kill or let live has commonly been referred to as the classical right of the12
sword. The emergence of biopower, alongside the theory of right represented the beginning of modern
challenges to sovereign power by centering not on the ability to invoke death, but on life. The emergence of
biopower involved the problematization of life in relation to political obligation, representing a reversal of
the sovereign maxim, “the power to “make” live and “let” die.”  According to Foucault, this moment of13
reversal signals the threshold of the modern era, when a society’s political strategies are wagered on the
bodies and the life of a species. Says Foucault, “For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a
living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics
calls his existence as a living being into question.”  Natural life, as distinguished from political life, has14
become the focus for the mechanisms and calculations of state power, signalling a passage from the
“territorial State” to the “State of population” whereby the bare life of the nation became a problem of
sovereign power, eventually transforming into a “government of men.”15
While not replacing, but rather penetrating and operating alongside sovereign power, biopower
characterizes liberal practices of government.  According to Foucault, the era of biopower gave rise to the
practice of government in which “the disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted
the two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed.”  Indeed, notes Colin Gordon,16
“Foucault saw it as a characteristic (and troubling) property of the development of the practice of government
in Western societies to tend towards a form of political sovereignty which would be a government of all and
each, and whose concerns would be at once to ‘totalize’ and to ‘individualize’.”  The individualizing aspect17
of biopower, signifies disciplinary techniques of power first developed and institutionalized in the
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seventeenth century, and theorized by Foucault in relation to the prison, the asylum, and the clinic.
Disciplinary techniques focus at the level of individual bodies and often involve panoptic forms of
institutional surveillance. The totalizing character of biopolitics, on the other hand, involves calculations
from which the ‘wealth,’ ‘health,’ or ‘illness’ of the population (of a state) can be measured by addressing
human beings as “a global mass.”  18
Biopolitics is the endeavour “to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the
phenomena characteristic of a group of living beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birthrate,
longevity, race….”  Thus, Foucault linked the deployment of biopolitical techniques – which work to invest,19
enhance and modify life – with the emergence of governmentality which sought to govern citizens in new
ways that are distinct from authoritarian rule  and “most especially through acquired habits of self-control,20
reinforced by the normative gaze of others and the work of a variety of state and non-state agencies.”21
Governmentality is aimed at forms of knowledge that have traditionally separated the domain of the state
from other spaces by operating through the self-governing capabilities of individuals, spaces, and categories.
Biopolitics is thus a specifically liberal method of governance that is informed by the limited role of the state
as a coherent apparatus, in favour of governance ‘at a distance.’ With a focus on ‘life’ the subjects of liberal
governance are capacitated to formulate their own imperatives and (counter) demands around that same
‘life.’  Members of a population are encouraged to exercise forms of self-regulation in ways that are22
beneficial to the population as a whole. The optimization of life through management of a population does
not discipline individuals coercively, but attempts to conduct conduct,  by disposing, rather than23
commanding, people to comport themselves in a manner that is contributes to the overall health of the state
in biological and (liberal) political terms.  
In addition to biopolitics as a technology that conceives of a population and addresses it as a political
problem, Foucault was insistent on two additional characteristics. The phenomena that are considered are
collective to the extent that only the mass level is taken into account. Biopolitics addresses “serial
phenomena” that are “essentially aleatory events that occur within a population that exists over a period of
time.”  Finally, in contrast to disciplinary mechanisms, that respond to events or behaviours, biopolitics24
intervenes “at the level in which these phenomena are determined” and introduces regulatory mechanisms
that “must be established to establish an equilibrium, maintain an average, establish a homeostasis, and
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compensate for variations within this general population and its aleatory field,”  thereby serving as an25
effective strategy of normalization.  26
Biopolitics and Security
As a distinctively liberal form of governance, biopolitics is also entangled with modern security practices.
Gordon notes that according to Foucault, modern liberalism departed from prior conceptions of order through
police and instead framed order in “mechanisms of security.”  Security is increasingly the principle27
component of governmental rationality, he argued, that is both formulated through liberal governance and
is intimately biopolitical in its focus at the level of population.  Distinct from sovereignty, discipline, and28
law, security operates as “a specific principle of political method and practice…capable of various modes
of combination with these other principles and practices within diverse governmental configurations.”  The29
regulatory mechanisms of biopolitics that intervene at the level in which phenomena are determined are
simultaneously security mechanisms that are directed to optimize and regulate life by addressing random
elements or problems found in a population, in contrast to achieving desired outcomes by training individual
bodies.  The consistency between the operations of biopolitics and mechanisms of security are expounded30
by Foucault’s identification of three traits of security. As Gordon explains, 
It deals in series of possible and probable events; it evaluates through calculations of
comparative cost; it prescribes not by absolute binary demarcation between the permitted
and the forbidden, but by the specification of an optimal mean within a tolerable bandwidth
of variation. Whereas sovereignty has as its object the extended space of a territory, and
discipline focuses on the body of the individual (albeit treated as a member of a determinate
collectivity), security addresses itself distinctively to ‘the ensemble of a population.’31
To optimize and regulate the life of a population is therefore to secure it from threats. As Foucault
writes, “this is a technology which aims to establish a sort of homeostasis, not by training individuals, but
by achieving an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal threats.”  32
The mobilization of security to address elusive ‘threats,’ is principally expressed through discourses
of ‘risk.’  Nikolas Rose argues that as the exercise of political authority is increasingly and primarily guided
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by the biological, vital reality of a people, requiring a “nationally organized and politically directed
programme to improve the quality of the national stock and eliminate taints or weaknesses that might threaten
it,” the proper care and protection of life becomes tied to the purging of those seen to constitute a threat to
the whole.  Rose ties the neo-hygienist and eugenic form of biopolitics in the first half of the twentieth33
century, which posited the health of individuals in terms of the fitness of national populations, to competitive
inter-state projects. As he notes, “Population fitness was liable to threats from within and without, and
national governments had the obligation to guard against these threats and to take measures to enhance
fitness through policies that were formulated by, and enacted through, the apparatus of the state.”  The34
prevalence of ‘risks’ became a motivating factor for the deployment of national programs to guard and
improve the life of a population through security techniques. 
This coincides with both Giorgio Agamben's and Zygmut Bauman’s argument that the project of
biopolitics contains a form of thanatopolitics of population purification because “to manage the health of the
‘body politic’ inescapably requires the control and elimination of ‘foreign bodies’.”  The biopolitical35
strategies intended to manage the political problem of the population, to protect the inside from internal
discord or disunity, intersect with various forms of national policy/power that present the collusion of
modern power with sovereign and juridical power, and population with territory.  Indeed, the problem of36
the population was first signified by a shift in focus from epidemics characterized by fleeting disasters
causing mass death, to endemics involving difficult to eradicate and often permanent illnesses rife in a
population that led to the introduction of national standards and centralized institutions for the management
of the health of the population.  Canada’s national security policy is designed to respond to ‘fleeting’ natural37
or technological disasters, as well as long-term pandemic disease outbreaks and ‘terrorism’ as objects of
security. As a thanopolitical governmental tactic, however, the policy does not merely encapsulate issues
from disease to ‘terrorism,’ but functions as a cleansing strategy that constitutes these issues as indeterminate
security risks that require continual monitoring and intervention. As Foucault contended that since the
eighteenth century rationalities of government have been filtered through security, modern society, he
concluded, is a society of security.  38
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National Security and Canadian Values
The opening of Canada’s national security policy points to a history of wide-ranging threats while also
positioning the document as a response to an “increasingly complex and dangerous threat environment.”39
The framing of this ‘threat’ environment signifies two things. First, it holds that the prevalence of threats has
become an immanent characteristic of contemporary society and second that, like never before, there are
multiple sources of threat. Chapter one lays out a series of “current threats.” This includes terrorism, which
can take the form of religious extremism, violent secessionist movements, state-sponsored terrorism and
domestic extremism.  Other sources of threat include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed40
and failing states that may ‘spread instability’ or become a haven for corruption and crime, and foreign
espionage that threatens the prosperity and competitiveness of Canadian business through stealing of
“industrial and economic secrets.”  Natural disasters, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, such as the41
blackout in Ontario and eight US states in August 2003, the growth of ‘cyber attacks,’ and organized crime
involving narcotics and weapons trade, smuggling of migrant workers and the trafficking in persons, serve
as additional sources of threat. Last, pandemics such as SARS are noted as representing the spread of disease
as a result of increased travel in a globalizing world.  The policy is intended to account for the security42
challenge of each of these threats, as well as the ways in which they are interconnected. The document
declares the government’s commitment to “meet the new risk environment” because as “security is also about
managing and reducing risks,” the national security system “must be capable of responding proportionately
to existing threats while adapting quickly to meet new threats that may emerge.”  43
A second truth expounded by the document concerns claims about Canadian values. At the outset
a desire for security is located at the intersection of colonialism and state formation. The very creation of
‘Canada’ it notes, was a security initiative “in order to provide peace, order and good government for
Canadians.”  Such ‘good’ governance of the Canadian population suggests that biopolitical techniques of44
liberal governance extend as deep as modernity’s reason of state. This sentiment underpins the design of the
comprehensive policy that “proposes a framework for addressing threats to Canadians…in a way that fully
reflects and supports key Canadian values of democracy, human rights, respect for the rule of law, and
pluralism,” reflecting “core national security interests.”  Elaborated in a section of chapter one devoted to45
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articulating the relationship between security and values, it is insisted that Canadian values are enabled and
assured through the security approach advanced.  46
There is a notable discursive othering of those who are seen as not sharing these Canadian values.
For instance, the statement that “No one better appreciates the need to protect our society than those who
chose this country as a place to build a better life or who fled the consequences of instability and intolerance
in other parts of the world” is prefaced with the assertion that “Canadians stand together in reaffirming that
the use of violence to pursue political, religious or ideological goals is an affront to our values and must be
met with a determined response by Canadians and their governments.”  Somewhere between the people who47
‘chose’ Canada and the homogenous ‘Canadians’ opposed to violence, is the insertion of some non-Canadian
‘other’ (in a legal or national sense). This coded non-Canadian ‘other’ leaves suspect the special mention of
immigrants and refugees as appreciative subjects of ‘Canadian values.’ 
Practices of othering can also be identified through the manner in which Canadian values are
mobilized as a strategy for managing difference as a site of risk.  A concern for maintaining an ‘open48
society,’ while first articulated through the treatment of Canadian values as a definable and homogenous set
of objects, then picks up the issue of differences among members of the population identified as ‘ethno-
cultural’ and religious.  To be sure, such references to ‘ethno-cultural’ differences are typically discursive49
racializations or identifiers of ‘othered’ categories of non-white people of non-European descent.  While50
the language chosen avoids casting such ‘othered’ groups as threats explicitly, the policy employs ‘ethnic’
and religious categories to articulate how components of the population require special management
techniques for the security of the population as a whole. Thus, in the context of addressing the problem of
terrorism the policy notes the presence of “communities in Canada that may feel caught in the “front lines,””
which necessitates the creation of a “Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security.”  The Roundtable is intended51
to “engage in long-term dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse
society and will provide advice to promote the protection of civil order, mutual respect and common
understanding.”  While it is noted that partnerships will be formed with all communities to “ensure that52
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there is zero tolerance for terrorism or crimes of hate in Canada,”  the initiative is deployed against a53
backdrop of historically racialized communities who signify the ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds
from which ‘diversity’ is constituted. The need to address the ‘problem’ of ethno-cultural and religious
difference is thus marked on the bodies of ‘othered’ groups and locates them as security risks that require
management. This only becomes more apparent where the document urges Canadians to “deal frankly” with
the new complex security environment because “the seeds of conflict and extremism can take root even in
the most tolerant of settings.”  The national security policy is proposed on the grounds that risks to the54
Canadian population are posed from within and without, lending currency to desires to establish protocols
to detect such threats. 
Significantly, the policy’s discourse on Canadian values is not simply limited to constituting an
‘other,’ but also to the invention of ‘self.’ The use of Canadian values to rationalize the need for a national
security policy serves as a performative act that (re)inscribes an identity for the Canadian state. Acts of
othering are always simultaneously claims to identity. The identity of Canada, like all other forms of identity,
is constituted in relation to difference that, as David Campbell’s work has shown, inscribe “boundaries that
serve to demarcate an “inside” from an “outside,” a “self” from an “other,” a “domestic” from a “foreign.”“55
Thus, the constitution of an ‘other’ is a performative constitution that has no origin outside of a continual
state of relationality. This performative character of Canadian identity is deeply implicated in, and indeed
thrives on, the construction of its own alterity. Consequently, the idea that Canadian values have been
presented with unique challenges, or are faced with encroaching dangers in the post 9/11 period, “objectifies
events, disciplines relations and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk” and
consequently legitimates the need to take defensive action in the name of security.56
Population Security
A central concern in Securing an Open Society is how best to protect the health and safety of the Canadian
population, in contrast to the association of security only with the life of the State independent of its
inhabitants.  This care the population is not confined to the chapter devoted explicitly to ‘Public Health
Emergencies,’ but is a concern that shapes the policy as a whole. This is first evident by how occurrences
that are unlikely to directly compromise the sovereign, territorial, or legal presence of a state are positioned
as explicit threats to national security, such as pandemics, unexpected natural disasters and critical
infrastructure breakdowns. Second, other identified threats such as ‘terrorism’ and foreign espionage that
resemble more traditional, direct threats to the sovereign power of the state, are largely treated as threats to
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the well-being and prosperity of the population. The conflation of the behaviour of states and the structure
of the state system with Hobbes’s state of nature thesis have meant that national security policies have tended
to be interpreted as having an overriding concern with the survival of the state from threats posed by other
states in an anarchical international realm in which states are claimed to be the only, or primary, actors.57
Thus, despite the potency of the traditional reason of state logic that has carried interpretive force in shaping
the meaning of national security, the policy in question articulates a biopolitical orientation to threats in an
arena in which the operation of sovereign power and ‘reason of state’ logic are most potent. In an important
sense, this signals a shift in the problem of sovereign power from a sole concern with territory to conceive
of and include a population. National security as a mechanism of state power can thus be seen to draw in
biological life aside from a predominant association of the state with legal rights and a social contract.  
Drawing on the ideas of Carl Schmitt, Italian critic and theorist Giorgio Agamben provides a useful
way to understand this relationship between sovereignty and biopolitical concerns with biological or bare
life. Agamben borrows Schmitt’s idea that the structure of sovereignty is based on the notion of the
exception.  This perspective holds that sovereign power derives its force from the capacity to create a state58
of exception by suspending normal rules and laws; meaning that what is outside of the sphere of sovereignty
is not its ‘outside.’ Instead, the sovereign’s authority to decide upon the exception means that the outside is
always already included within the sphere of sovereignty. The relation of exception signals that sovereignty
and human life are not related by a social contract, but that it is the bare life of human beings that function
as the foundation for the state’s legitimacy and sovereign power. According to Agamben, “from the point
of view of sovereignty, only bare life is authentically political;” it is “the always present and always operative
presupposition of sovereignty.”  Consequently, biopolitics as a power that is focussed on species life is59
intimately connected to sovereign authority, as well as state formation. Not only is it modernity’s less
obvious ‘reason of state,’ its concurrent association with the creation of state policies and programs for the
administration of the population of a state, blurs the borders between ‘state’ and ‘society.’
A significant effect of the linkage between national security and population health and safety that
characterizes biopolitical practices can be seen by the creation of the Department of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness. As Paul Martin remarked, the new department exercises jurisdiction over “core
functions of security and intelligence, policing and enforcement, corrections and crime prevention, border
services, immigration enforcement, and emergency management.”  This overarching public security ministry60
swallowed the agencies of the Solicitor General’s portfolio, which includes the RCMP, CSIS, Correctional
Services of Canada, and the National Parole Board, while additionally encompassing public health, border
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security, and disaster response.  The policy notes that the new minister, along with the Cabinet Committee61
on Security, Public Health and Emergencies and the recently appointed National Security Advisor, “will
ensure the development and implementation of the security system.”  The new department is the designated62
body through which most of the policy will be implemented and coordinated, signaling how the security
system, while including sovereign territoriality, is situated at the level of public health and safety to address
regulative and disciplinary problems within the Canadian population itself.
The treatment of the population as the primary object of national security by the national security
policy and the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, suggests a transformation in the
meaning of security adopted by Canada’s security strategy. The policy declares that the government
recognizes no higher obligation than to ensure the well-being of its citizens and that the criteria for what
constitutes a national security concern encompasses “events and circumstances that generally require a
national response.”  In addition, Wark notes that despite the identification of the new department by some63
as ‘Homeland Security lite’ a unique feature is its definition of security.  In tandem with the national64
security policy, the new department defines security, in addition to ‘terrorist’ threats, as embracing health
pandemics, and natural and human created disasters. The broader security threats addressed are largely
mobilized around the linkage of national security to public emergencies, enabled by the inclusion of the
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness into the new department, notes
Wark.  The maximizing of emergency preparedness as seen in both the policy and the department broadens65
what counts as a security threat because with “the overriding objective,” remarks Paul Martin, “to make a
positive difference in the lives of Canadians” very little is left unaccounted for.  66
Another distinguishing feature of the new department is the announcement that it is to have no
authority over immigration functions, which is intended to avoid the identification of immigrants and
refugees as threats to national security. Some commentators have noted that the broadening of the security
agenda to include pandemics and natural disasters on the one hand, and the omission of immigration
functions on the other, make for both a more and less sweeping department than the Department of Homeland
Security in the US.  However, the addition of the newly created Canada Border Services Agency in67
December 2003 to the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which is reported to
include “7,000 federal employees responsible for customs duties; the inspection of passengers, animals,
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plants, and food; and immigration services such as investigations, intelligence and deportations,” suggests
that it may simply be more sweeping.  It would seem inaccurate to suggest, for instance, that the elaborate68
border functions of the new department do not play at least an indirect role in determining the fate of many
refugees and immigrants. The thirty percent reduction in the number of refugee claimants from January to
June of this year suggests that this may be a fair assessment.69
Illustrating the manner in which sovereign power works in conjunction with biopolitics, the security
strategy used by the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness’ has unique characteristics
that merit discussion. As R. B. J. Walker notes, the fundamental purpose of concepts of security in relation
to the sovereign state “is that they must expand to encompass everything within the state, at least in its ever-
potential state of emergency.”  Through this care of the population, security mechanisms take on a totalizing70
function, whereby the Department’s national security objectives involve defining ‘states of exception,’
through its administrative power to declare emergencies within the broadest possible definitions, the most
wide-ranging objects of security, and under virtually any circumstance concerning ‘life.’ The mandate and
administrative capacity of the Department signifies how the exercise of political authority through national
security practices can be principally guided by the vital reality of the Canadian population.  
Surveillance and Security
Critical theorists have tended to draw on Foucault’s conceptualization of disciplinary power to explain the
explosion and technological innovations of surveillance and intelligence in the modern era.  Beginning in71
the seventeenth century Foucault saw a “movement of exceptional discipline to one of generalized
surveillance…the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline…their spread throughout the whole
social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society.”  The normalizing72
character of a society invested in a power focussed on life is the result of discipline’s operation as “a
discourse about a natural rule, or in other words a norm,” as distinct from law.  The expansion of73
surveillance linked to the formation of a disciplinary society invested in the instantiation of “natural rules,”
has witnessed the development of liberalism that has involved governance through mechanisms that enable
greater freedom. Thus, the modern nation state’s connection to the development of surveillance as a principle
method of administrative control has involved power that can be experienced as an empowering aspect of
liberal subjectivity. To borrow from James Der Derian, surveillance is thus increasingly less reliant on
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centralized authoritarian power and instead operates as “the new technostrategic force of normalization in
world politics.”  74
In line with the normalizing function of surveillance, David Lyon offers a fittingly expanded
conception of surveillance that includes the “mundane, ordinary, taken-for-granted world of getting money
from a bank machine, making a phone call, applying for sickness benefits, driving a car…”  He suggests that75
interactions in modern liberal societies almost always entail a trace of our doings, making surveillance both
a conduit of the capitalist marketplace, as well as a product of bureaucratization and the governmental
administration.  Techniques of surveillance, he notes, have set in motion expanding citizenship rights to76
social services such as healthcare and welfare, indicating the extent to which surveillance has become
entwined with modern practices of liberal government. Lyon suggests that this ‘rise of surveillance society’
has witnessed the mobilization of a panoptic gaze over many aspects of people’s lives. While the panopticon
has generally been used only with reference to disciplinary forms of surveillance, in recent work Lyon has
suggested that for Foucault, there is not merely one aspect of panoptic surveillance, but two:  the panopticon
as the unseen observer and the panopticon as a classificatory power.  In the latter instance, surveillance77
identifies and seeks to regulate the objects (health, sanitation, birthrates, race, crime, etc.) that biopolitics
endeavours to rationalize. Such classificatory techniques of surveillance are mobilized not in the interests
of disciplining bodies to achieve a particular conduct, but to do away with corrupting factors that threaten
the security of the population as a whole. As discussed below, the surveillance strategies proposed in the
national security policy serve as an example of how the panoptic character of surveillance has been
articulated through a variety of regulatory mechanisms. It is after all through the application of surveillance
mechanisms that the problems of a population are revealed, assessed and categorized according to the ‘risk’
they may hold.   
A recent media headline that reads “McLellen says Canada’s No. 1 security objective is to shore up
intelligence gathering”  is squarely reflected in the national security policy and highlights an increasing78
reliance on surveillance.  Intelligence is the first key area identified in the policy and is declared to be the
foundation for national security.  The expansion of intelligence mechanisms is, in part, justified on the79
grounds that “intelligence reporting and assessments are based on fragmented and sometimes contradictory
information,” making it “essential to bring together information on threats to Canada from all available
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sources and properly assess it in order to provide as accurate and complete a picture as possible.”80
Intelligence is also advanced as a necessary approach to the transboundary nature of current threats, including
‘terrorist’ threats, pandemics, weapons proliferation, failed and failing states, and organized crime. 
Yet, while the national security policy is shaped by the expansion of intelligence activities, the
commitment to bolstering intelligence, like the formation of the national security policy generally, did not
begin with the release of the policy document, but has been part of a lengthier process of surveillance
enhancement in the wake of September 11  2001. This has involved additional funding to enhance capacitiesth
in various departments and agencies, such as the Canadian Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, and
the doubling of the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office.  Intensified surveillance81
was also made possible by bringing together the Canada Border Services Agency, CSIS, the RCMP, and
Emergency Management under the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Department, and was further
complemented by the National Security Advisor of the PCO who “briefs the Prime Minster and the Deputy
Prime Minister on national security from an integrated government-wide perspective.”  Budgetary increases82
of 30 percent and 25 percent were made for CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment
respectively, and the mandate of the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada was
expanded to “to identify, assess and track suspicious transfers of money that could indicate support for
terrorist activity.”  83
The policy shows that these increased intelligence capacities were just the beginning of an
unprecedented expansion of surveillance practices. The policy pledges to “devote a greater proportion of our
efforts to security intelligence” to address “the security threats facing Canada and our allies” with an
additional $167 million for distribution in a number of areas.  Taking cues from the United States, the84
United Kingdom, and Australia, a noted feature is the creation of a new integrated ‘Threat Assessment
Centre,’ described as “a community-wide resource” that will conduct a “comprehensive analysis of all
available information on potential threats to Canada and make the results of that analysis available to all who
require them.”  A range of bodies including Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, CSIS, the RCMP,85
the Communications Security Establishment, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, the Privy Council Office, Transport Canada, and the Canada Border Services Agency will support
and staff the new Centre. As required, the Centre will draw on expertise from other departments and
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agencies, including Health Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, and Environment Canada.  There86
is also a special section titled ‘Working with Our Allies’ which notes the international character of the
“evolving security environment” and signals, but does not specify, the development of “important new
relationships” to focus on “anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, new and emerging health concerns and the
protection of our armed forces personnel deployed abroad.”  These activities outlined in the ‘Intelligence’87
chapter, while not encompassing the full scope of plans for surveillance enhancement, testify to the coupling
of issues that have traditionally been taken up only under the logic of sovereignty, with matters concerned
with administering of the health and safety of the citizenry. This enhancement of surveillance as a principal
security mechanism enables concern for the health and safety of the population to be conjoined with the
maintenance state. Indeed, the enhancement of surveillance is dispersed far beyond military and diplomatic
functions, and is taken up primarily as an administrative task.
In addition to the chapter titled ‘Intelligence,’ the national security policy’s new commitment to
intelligence is reflected in the all the other ‘key measures,’ including ‘Emergency Planning and
Management,’ ‘Public Health Emergencies,’ ‘Transport Security,’ ‘Border Security’ and ‘International
Security,’ set out in the policy. This is the effect of the policy’s “integration” strategy, which works to
enhance the reach of intelligence activities to benefit the goals of all six key areas. In an important way,
intelligence plays the critical link between national security activities by working to close “security gaps”
with the overall trajectory of totalizing the capacity of the national security system.
An examination of the key areas of the national security policy highlights important aspects of the
meaning and focus of security that also deserve attention. While traditional issues, such as international,
border and transportation security are covered, other areas address emergency planning and public safety,
which are meant to encapsulate critical infrastructural malfunctions (in response to the Blackout in August
2003 that left most parts of Ontario and a number of states in the US without electricity for days) and public
health emergencies (such SARS). The inclusion of these latter two issue areas suggests that the Canadian
government’s security agenda has broadened beyond traditional military concerns, and adopted a security
perspective that some may argue fits squarely with it’s purported commitment to adopt a human security
agenda. But what is most interesting about this turn of events in the context of this discussion is the way in
which the security rubric exposes an indistinction between these formerly disparate realms of concern. It is
not simply that security has been refocused on non-traditional areas of state administration, but as the
following discussion of the key measures shows, the biopolitical character of security has ceased to recognize
a distinction.  
The ‘Emergency Planning and Management’ and ‘Public Health Emergencies’ measures are provided
with increased surveillance capacities for the detection of public health and infrastructure emergencies. In
addition to the recent integration of the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection into the Department of
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Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the ‘Emergency Planning and Management’ measure involves
the creation of a Government Operations Centre also to be housed in the new department.  This is intended88
to “provide stable round-the-clock co-ordination and support across government and to key national players
in the event of national emergencies.”  Aside from the purchase of new equipment to track and detect89
‘bioterrorism’ and the increased support for the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, which conducts
surveillance with an ‘early warning’ internet system to detect health risks from disease outbreaks and
contaminated foods to natural disasters and ‘bioterrorism,’  new measures in the key area of ‘Public Health90
Emergencies’ are proposed. It is noted, “Public health surveillance will be enhanced” with superior standards
for data collection and collaboration with provinces and “stakeholders.”  As well, the ‘Canada Health91
Infoway’ will support the implementation of a national public health surveillance system with an additional
$100 million of funding from the 2004 budget.  The identification of these areas as ‘key measures’ for92
national security, as well as the surveillance capacities that they entail, are directed towards the regulation
of characteristics found within a population – from rates of illnesses related to food quality and disease
outbreaks to criminal activity – insofar as they as seen to threaten the health and safety of the population
generally. 
A variety of new and expanded regulatory surveillance mechanisms have been expended on the more
traditional “key” areas of transportation, borders, and international security. What is most interesting about
these surveillance enhancements is not only an intensified focus on detecting threats through totalizing
surveillance mechanisms, but the reliance on monitoring biological substances and biological characteristics
of the population, as opposed to ‘political’ issues, to secure the state. For transportation security, airport
screening of goods and people, undercover operations, inspections of transportation workers and enhanced
detection technologies for land, air and sea are mandated. New investments in trace detection systems,
gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers as well as “permit effective and unobtrusive screening of
containers for explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological devices.” are set out in the policy.93
Similarly, detection strategies are key to border security enhancement along with and new funds for
“LiveScan” digital fingerprinting,  an ‘RCMP Real Time Identification project’ that enables the electronic94
recording of fingerprints for instant verification, and biometrically enabled smart chips that use facial







 Lyon, “Surveillance After September 11, 2001.” 309. 101
recognition technologies “to interrupt the flow of high-risk travelers” have also been mandated.  Ten new95
countries were added to the list of those with visa requirements and improvements were made to the
screening of VISA applicants abroad. The ‘Smart Borders’ strategy with the US “to enhance the security of
the flow of goods and people and the transportation system, and to strengthen intelligence and law
enforcement co-operation” will continue to be developed.  The policy notes that Canada will also work with96
international partners and other G8 countries to internationalize Smart Borders programs, in addition to the
development of the expanded ‘Next Generation Smart Borders Agenda’ to include cyber-security, food
safety, public health, marine and transport security.”  Passenger screening while people are in the process97
of booking flight reservations destined for Canada is also under consideration.  Finally, International98
Security measures include the continuation of support for ‘counter-terrorism’ projects and capacity building
in ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states through funds from the International Assistance Envelope,  which have tended99
to focus on health issues that, if excessively neglected, are considered to contribute to international crime.
Tellingly, it is noted that the confluence between the security interests and international policy goals of
Canada can be seen by how its democratic and pluralist characteristics provide the means through with
‘failed and failing’ states can be assisted “in the struggle against terrorism.”  This commitment to100
international security points to the ways in which poor and less developed countries are positioned as a threat
to global security and consequently require monitoring and intervention. 
It is significant to note the similarity between the detection strategies and mechanisms in both
traditional and non-traditional sets of key security arenas, and highlights the extent to which the classificatory
power of surveillance is applied at the level of the population. As groups and individuals are constantly “risk-
profiled” very little is left outside the purview of security. According to Lyon, this can be seen by how the
commercial sphere sorts people into consumer categories, and the social dangerousness of people is rated
by policing and intelligence systems.  Biopolitical strategies of surveillance are not principally oriented to101
the past (to reform deviance), but to the future as a mechanism of control concerned with producing the
conditions through which members of a population are subjected to continual and expansive risk profiling
as a strategy to render the population, and consequently the state, safe and healthy. It is this link between
biopolitics as a productive method of governing populations through security apparatuses that provides a
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decisive turn for surveillance to be constituted as a ‘libratory’ mechanism of societies characterized by the
prevalence of ‘risk.’ 
Contemporary biopolitics, in contrast to biopolitics in the first half of the twentieth century, is also
instructive in its sensitivity to liberalist conceptions of multiculturalism and notions of citizen responsibility.
The notion of society as composed of a single national culture, with a specific national destiny tied to a
national territory, argues Rose, has entered a crisis which has seen the pluralizing of ‘culture’ to ‘cultures,’
and ‘community’ to ‘communities.’  Not only is this crisis reflected in Canada’s multicultural policy102
generally, but it has informed the creation of the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security to supplement the
development of the national security policy. Rose argues that, among other transformations, this crisis has
led to a responsiblization of citizens. In the quest for health, citizens are encouraged to become active
partners who are accountable “for securing their own well-being.”  The enterprises involved in this “will103
to health” involve wide ranging aspirations for health in which the “conduct of individuals is governed ‘at
a distance,’ by shaping the ways in which they understand and enact their own freedom.”  The ‘invitation’104
for ‘diverse communities’ to participate in Canada’s national security endeavours is such a case in point.
Technological innovations in surveillance as seen in the new security policy enable security measures to be
cast as a “will to health” as national security does not only involve prohibitive or coercive mechanisms
imposed against the will of its targets. Rather, it may also operate as a productive power that produces the
wills of individuals, particularly through discourses of rights and responsibilities in a political context that
is increasingly characterized by a range of calculated risks. The normalization of elaborate security
operations can be seen by how increasingly, notes Rose, “surveillance is ‘designed in’ to the flows of
everyday existence.”  As Lyon notes, the post September 11  ‘panic regime’ shows that “anxious publics105 th
are willing to put up with many more intrusions, interceptions, delays, and questions than was the case before
September 11.”  The deployment of mechanisms of state intervention to securitize biological, economic106
and social processes that concern a population, in conjunction with rationalities of responsibilizaton that treat
constituents as facilitators of security, posits security as a condition of liberty.  This is a process of107
subjectification, which Michael Dillon defines as,   
[A]n order of knowledgeable practices, norms of conduct, and elaborate protocols of
behavior. Its object is to produce calculable subjects operating in calculable spaces,
formidably empowered by their very subscription to, indeed inscription into force by,
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technologies of calculation. The defining and distinguishing paradox of power/knowledge
is therefore that it is that very subjectification to power that is empowering.  108
Consequently, ‘risk’ as a category of existence rationalizes freedom not as constrained by mechanisms of
security, but as protected by them. In a society of security, such forms of regularized freedom are normalized
into the paradoxical and everyday conditions of freedom and subjection.  In short, security tells people how109
to be good citizens.
Security, Racism, and Terrorism
As an instrument of governance, security operates quite separately from discipline and law. As Agamben
writes, “While disciplinary power isolates and closes off territories, measures of security lead to an opening
and to globalization…security intervenes in ongoing processes to direct them;” while it is the goal of
discipline to bring about order, “security wants to regulate disorder.”  These attempts to regulate disorder110
through mechanisms of security allow for security to become the sole criteria for the legitimation of state
activity. This neutralization of politics to security, which very much coalesces around ‘risk,’ he notes, also
contains its own essential risk. “A state which has security as its sole task and source of legitimacy is a
fragile organism,” he writes, “it can always be provoked by terrorism to become itself terroristic.”111
Baudrillard similarly contends that as terrorism and the repression of terrorism hold the same
unpredicitablity, it is difficult to distinguish between them.  The regulations enforced by security measures,112
he argues, are an internalization of defeat in a state of absolute disorder.  With the culmination of war as113
an activity only among states or aspiring states, “it becomes clear that security finds its end in globalization,
argues Agamben, because “it implies the idea of a new planetary order which is in truth the worst of all
disorders.”  This disorder is liberal globalization manifested in its opposite form, writes Baudrillard, “a114
police-state globalization, a total control, a terror based on ‘law and order’ measures.”  The compatibility115
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of security and terrorism ends in a legitimation of the actions of each other, forming “a single deadly
system.”  116
This relationship between security and terror signifies deeper qualities about biopower and the
connection it posits between life and death. According to Foucault, biopower is centred on life essentially
to the exclusion of death such that death becomes taboo, privatized, and is pushed outside of the power
relationship.  The right to end life is diminished through biopower’s interventions that make live and117
improve life “by eliminating accidents, the random element, and the deficiencies” such that “death becomes,
insofar as it is the end of life, the term, the limit, or the end of power too.”  Yet, a certain formulation of118
the power to kill still remains operative within this technology. According to Foucault, biopolitics motivates
racism to intervene as the precondition for the right to kill. Racism, he writes, is “the break between what
must live and what must die” by “fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls…to subdivide
the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races.”  It functions by establishing a119
biopolitical relation of war organized around the maxim that “In order to live, you must destroy your
enemies.”  With the aim of improving life, racism establishes a biological rather than a warlike relationship120
between one’s life and the death of another. Killing thus becomes acceptable in the biopower system, not for
political victory, but only if it eliminates threats to the biological health of a race or species.  Rather than121
political adversaries, the enemies that are to be done away with are posited in evolutionary terms as internal
or external ‘threats’ to the population. “Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can
justify the murderous function of the State,” says Foucault, because racism “is bound up with the workings
of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its
sovereign power.”  Such a state of affairs is unlikely to come as much of a surprise to critical security and122
surveillance scholars who have long claimed that the issue of ethnicity has been pivotal to grasping the
Canadian security regime since its inception.  123
The hinging of social and political rights on the biological existence of a population, in contrast to
the association of rights with the capacities and obligations of individuals, raises yet more problems. As
Bell g Biopolitical Strategies of Security / 22
 Agamben, “On Security and Terror.” para 6. 124
  Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism .  16. 125
 Walker, “The Subject of Security.” 66. 126
 Lyon, The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. 62.127
security derives power from constant reference to a state of exception, it also simultaneously depoliticizes
society and ultimately, renders security mechanisms and democracy irreconcilable.  This effect means that124
political negotiations are neutralized and sites for instigating challenges to existing political arrangements,
such as the need for a ‘war against terrorism,’ or the need for risk factors to stand as the organizing principle
of a society, become imperceptible. Because threats and risks are constituted in biological terms, the ultimate
goal of a society as Baudrillard puts it, is “zero death,”  unseating the role of politics, political life, and125
ethical interrogations as meaningful criteria for decision-making. As Walker has observed, the possibility
of uttering security has become unresolvably linked to “our ability speak about and be many things other than
secure, and not least of our ability to be citizens, democrats, or even humans.”  126
Conclusion
The usefulness of critical considerations on the proliferation of security mechanisms is to be found in how
they seek to unseat the normalizing process entailed in security strategies themselves. For proponents of
human security the broadening of national security to focus on the vital life of the Canadian population may,
at first glance, appear to be a laudable endeavour. However, the alignment of security with the life of a
population detonates an arsenal of surveillance strategies only witnessed historically in circumstances of
totalitarianism. Lyon, for instance, notes how surveillance produces an inner compatibility between
democracy and totalitarianism,  which this essay suggests might be found in mechanisms of security that127
have been mobilized with particular force since September 11  2001, but also in response to the developmentth
of security as a strategy for freedom and well-being more generally. Thus, even while security has come to
mean new things, one must always be reminded of whose security is always already secured in the conditions
of sovereign statehood.   
It is important to raise questions about developments in security, as I have done here through a
consideration of Canada’s national security policy. This paper has proceeded by outlining Foucault’s ideas
of biopolitics in relation to security as an organizing principle of modern politics. It then proposed an
understanding of how ‘threat’ is linked to the production of Canadian values and Canada as a ‘risk society.’
It turned to consider how the biological existence of a population is conceived of as an object of security
through new arrangements in Canadian policy and the manner in which such arrangements are made possible
through the expansion and development of surveillance. Finally, the paper incorporated some considerations
on the implications posed by the connection between biopolitics and security. Canada’s new policy serves
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as only one example of how securitizing practices can present difficulties for attempts to confront state
authority when wars are no longer waged on behalf of a sovereign, but rather, on behalf of a people. 
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